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Introduction 
 
 
Limits of an “Energy Union” 
Only Pragmatic Progress on EU Energy Market Regulation Expected in the Coming Months 
Severin Fischer and Oliver Geden 
Since the Juncker Commission took office in late 2014, the idea of an “Energy Union” 
has been a central theme of the EU energy policy debate. Today, the Energy Union 
concept covers every area of current European energy and climate policy. Its primary 
objective is to create a coherent, overarching policy framework. From a political per-
spective, the Commission’s aim is to prevent any further renationalization of energy 
policy. But although the Member State governments constantly refer to the energy 
union concept, it is already clear that they will avoid or at least delay implementation 
of meaningful steps in the direction of such a union. Against this backdrop, it is un-
likely that any fundamental changes will take place in the near future. And over the 
next few years, the focus of EU energy and climate policy will be on pragmatic progress 
in the area of energy market regulation—not on strategic large-scale projects. 
 
In late February 2015, EU Commission Vice-
President Maros Šefčovič presented the out-
come of a months-long process of energy 
policy consultation and strategy develop-
ment. According to his statement, the Com-
mission’s goal of a “resilient Energy Union 
with a forward-looking climate change 
policy at its core” rests on five key pillars: 
energy security and solidarity, an integrated 
European energy market, increased energy 
efficiency, decarbonizing the economy, and 
intensified research and innovation. 
Due to the breadth and ambiguity of the 
energy union concept, the 28 heads of state 
and government had no difficulty reaching 
agreement at the March 2015 meeting 
of the European Council to continue their 
efforts to develop the concept further. In 
the coming months, the Commission will 
be making concrete proposals for the crea-
tion of the Energy Union. 
The long career of an 
ambiguous concept 
The Juncker Commission was not the first 
to present strategy papers on a Europe-wide 
energy union. Indeed numerous strategy 
papers have been written on the subject 
over the years and submitted to various 
political actors in the EU. Most of these 
were meant to be a blueprint for the fur-
ther integration of European energy policy. 
As early as 2010, then-President of the 
European Parliament Jerzy Buzek and for-
mer Commission President Jacques Delors 
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called for a politicization of EU energy 
policy, which they saw as focused too nar-
rowly on the internal market, through the 
creation of a “European Energy Communi-
ty”. Their primary goal at that time was to 
integrate the Central and Eastern European 
Member States into a system that would 
assure security of supply for all Europeans 
by establishing a new foundation for ener-
gy policy in primary law. Their proposal 
sparked debates among European politi-
cians. The Commission and Member State 
governments showed little interest in a 
fundamental debate on the subject, how-
ever, especially since the EU had just 
adopted a series of pro-integration decisions 
between 2007 and 2009, in particular the 
implementation of the energy and climate 
targets up to 2020 and the agreement on 
the Third Internal Energy Market Package. 
After years of stalemate on energy and 
climate policy, a substantive and thorough-
going debate finally began to gain momen-
tum in April 2014, triggered by an article 
in the Financial Times by then Polish Prime 
Minister (and current President of the Euro-
pean Council) Donald Tusk. The impetus 
for Tusk’s article was the polarized and 
increasingly contentious debate among 
the EU Member States over what priority 
climate and environmental policy consid-
erations should be given in the overall 
design of EU energy policy. Ecological 
aspects had sidelined issues that Central 
and Eastern European governments con-
sidered to have a more important place on 
the agenda: questions of supply security, 
intra-European solidarity, and on the 
handling of Russian gas imports. It was 
against this backdrop that Tusk wrote his 
deliberately provocative article emphasiz-
ing the potential of conventional indige-
nous energy sources (coal, shale gas) and 
nuclear energy as means to secure the EU’s 
energy supply and calling for a new policy 
approach centered around the creation of 
a Europe-wide energy union. 
The long-simmering disputes between 
the Northern and Western Europeans on 
the one side and the Central and Eastern 
Europeans on the other left the level of 
pragmatic policy debates in the context of 
the Ukrainian crisis. Gradually, the diver-
gent preferences of the Member State gov-
ernments developed into a fundamental 
conflict at the European level. In this con-
tentious political environment, new pro-
posals from the Commission had relatively 
little chance of success. The trend toward 
renationalization of energy and climate 
policy that had been ongoing since 2010 
now reached a new peak. 
It thus proved to be a smart diplomatic 
move when Jean-Claude Juncker took 
up Donald Tusk’s modified version of the 
Buzek/Delors proposal, even before he 
assumed office as the President of the Com-
mission in fall of 2014, and began cam-
paigning for a form of energy union that 
would include all of the key existing areas 
of EU energy and climate policy. The task 
of designing a framework strategy for such 
an Energy Union, which he assigned to the 
new Commission Vice-President Šefčovič 
and the Commissioner for Energy and Cli-
mate Action Miguel Arias Cañete, was for-
mulated in deliberately broad and ambigu-
ous terms. Up to now, all of the Member 
State governments have taken a positive 
stance on the Energy Union—but they con-
sistently try to use the concept in support 
of their own energy and climate policy 
positions within the EU. 
Commission on the defensive 
No other actor in the EU context has com-
mitted itself so clearly to the Energy Union 
as the Commission. The high priority of this 
issue on the Juncker agenda, the appoint-
ment of a Vice President for the Energy 
Union, and the inclusion of all activities in 
the area of energy and climate policy with-
in the overarching framework of the Energy 
Union make patently clear how much politi-
cal capital the Commission and its Presi-
dent are willing to invest in this process. 
Up to now, this agenda-setting strategy 
may appear to have paid off. Not only the 
Member State governments but also the 
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European Parliament, energy companies, 
think tanks, and industrial and environ-
mental associations have all issued position 
papers on the Energy Union and formulated 
their own “wish lists” for it. The Commis-
sion’s willingness to take up nearly all the 
suggestions it has received and to incorpo-
rate them into an overall concept has, how-
ever, tended to distract attention from the 
deep-seated conflicts of interest within EU 
energy and climate policy (see SWP Com-
ments 55/2014). 
In the past few years, even politically 
insignificant legislative procedures have 
been subjected to exhaustive discussion 
and debate at the level of the heads of state 
and government. This has undoubtedly 
weakened the role of the Commission and 
the European Parliament, with their gener-
ally more ambitious and pro-harmoniza-
tion positions. In this light, the Commis-
sion’s recent initiatives are not least of all 
a means of reaffirming its position within 
the complex of inter-institutional relation-
ships. The Commission is well aware of the 
danger that old conflicts could resurface 
in the upcoming phase of establishing the 
Energy Union. There is no other explana-
tion for the energy union concept, which 
is little more than a revamped version of 
existing instruments under a new name. 
Thus, the Commission is contenting itself 
with simply applying the guidelines and 
regulations that have been adopted in 
recent years without interruption. 
The “progress” of not moving 
backwards 
In the coming months, it will become 
clear where the priorities of the Commis-
sion actually lie and how willing the Mem-
ber States still are to pursue further inte-
gration. Fundamental conflicts of interest 
in the EU are usually not solved through 
comprehensive strategies but are made 
manageable through small, often incon-
spicuous, but problem-oriented steps in 
the direction of more harmonization. There 
are positive examples of this in EU energy 
policy: the provisions introduced by the EU 
to build reverse gas flows in Central and 
Eastern Europe have significantly improved 
supply security in the region, and today 
are making it possible to supply gas to the 
Ukraine as well. Western European elec-
tricity markets have also been successfully 
integrated without the aid of sweeping 
European policy concepts. The prominent 
pattern of integration in EU energy policy 
can thus be described as taking small steps 
toward harmonizing the internal market 
while maintaining national political pref-
erences. 
This approach will most likely also be 
taken as a model for future efforts to build 
a European Energy Union. Despite this 
analysis, the focus of policy debates in the 
coming months will most likely be on two 
different topics: joint gas purchases, and 
the governance structure for implementing 
the EU energy and climate targets for 2030. 
The Tusk proposal and the initial ideas 
for a Europe-wide energy union already 
identified the joint purchasing of gas by 
the EU as an important undertaking. It is 
envisioned as a means of increasing the 
bargaining power of European buyers when 
negotiating long-term contracts with Rus-
sian partners. 
While this proposal was met with a 
positive reception in security policy circles, 
most of the major actors in energy policy 
expressed astonishment at the intention 
to create apparently cartel-like structures 
in the internal market. Already during the 
first exchange within the responsible Coun-
cil working groups, it became clear that 
a majority of Member States rejected the 
plan. In its strategy paper on the Energy 
Union, the Commission stated that it would 
assess “options for voluntary demand aggre-
gation mechanisms” in gas purchasing. 
Whether these options will actually be con-
sidered seriously appears highly doubtful 
from today’s perspective. The same is true 
of another idea favored by many Central 
and Eastern European governments: that 
of creating significantly more transparency 
around existing commercial gas supply con-
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tracts. However, creating more price trans-
parency across the EU looks more likely to 
be achieved through the Commission’s anti-
trust proceedings against Gazprom’s busi-
ness practices, launched in late April 2015. 
In addition, the Commission has made 
much more promising proposals that have 
gone largely overlooked due to the highly 
charged debate over future relationships 
with Russian gas suppliers. These include 
stricter regulation and greater transparen-
cy in the use of natural gas storage facilities 
and a revision of the EU regulation on the 
security of gas supply, which stipulates a 
coordinated approach in the case of crisis 
and comprehensive crisis prevention. These 
initiatives have been met with little sup-
port in foreign and security policy circles 
but they would play a significant role in 
enabling the internal gas market to func-
tion smoothly and efficiently. The plans to 
expand and better coordinate the co-financ-
ing of cross-border infrastructure projects 
and to strengthen the role of the EU Agency 
for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators 
(ACER) promise to provide considerable 
added value for EU energy security. 
A second key theme of EU energy and 
climate policy discussions in the coming 
months will be the governance structure 
for the energy and climate targets for 2030. 
Since the European Council agreed in Octo-
ber 2014 to abolish binding national targets 
for the expansion of renewable energy in 
the next decade and instead to formulate 
only a binding EU-wide target for 2030, the 
Commission will have to strike a delicate 
balance between voluntary commitments 
by Member States and robust monitoring 
of national measures. The debate over what 
form an improved European coordination 
of national energy and climate policies 
should take, and what the focal points of 
that coordination should look like shares 
many similarities with the deliberations 
over intensified economic policy coordina-
tion within the EU (“European Semester”). 
This will reveal the narrow limits of the 
Energy Union. For precisely this reason, 
the Commission has left the topic of govern-
ance out of its strategy paper at this stage 
entirely. 
The energy union debate as a 
symptom of crisis 
The debate over an energy union has 
gained significant momentum since 2014, 
creating the impression that the EU is on 
track to achieving substantial progress on 
integration. But a closer look shows, that 
most of the Member States are still openly 
resisting the convergence pressure they 
created for themselves through their jointly 
adopted energy and climate targets for 2030, 
and that they are still insisting on the pri-
macy of national sovereignty over energy 
policy. The energy union discourse should 
thus be interpreted mainly as a symptom 
of an EU integration crisis. 
For the Commission, the broad debate on 
the Energy Union still fulfills an important 
function. Compelling the Member States to 
agree to the Energy Union in principle will 
increase the near-term probability of more 
pragmatic and less politicized progress in 
energy market regulation. And the more 
integrated national electricity and gas mar-
kets become, the more important EU-wide 
governance of energy policy will be in the 
medium to long term. 
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